The Vanishing Hmong: Forced Repatriation to an Uncertain Future by Currie, L. Catherine
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 34 | Number 1 Article 5
Fall 2008
The Vanishing Hmong: Forced Repatriation to an
Uncertain Future
L. Catherine Currie
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
L. C. Currie, The Vanishing Hmong: Forced Repatriation to an Uncertain Future, 34 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 325 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol34/iss1/5
The Vanishing Hmong: Forced Repatriation to an Uncertain Future
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This comments is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation:
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol34/iss1/5
THE VANISHING HMONG:
FORCED REPATRIATION TO AN UNCERTAIN
FUTUREt
I. Introduction ....................................................................... 326
II. W ho are the "H m ong?". .................................................... 327
III. The CIA Funded "Secret Army" ....................... 328
IV . The "Jungle Hm ong" ........................................................ 330
A. Lao Military Attacks on the Jungle Hmong ................ 332
B. Surrender Attempts by the Jungle Hmong .................. 333
C. Jungle Conditions Documented by Visiting
Journalists ................................................................... 335
V. The Lao-Hmong in Thailand ............................................. 339
A. The Status of the Asylum-Seeking Hmong ................. 339
B. History of Asylum-Seeking Hmong and Refugee
Cam ps in Thailand ...................................................... 342
C. Repatriation Efforts Since 2004 .................................. 346
D. Current State of Lao-Hmong Repatriation .................. 349
V I. Lao G overnm ent ................................................................ 352
V II. Recom m endations .............................................................. 354
A. International Attention as a Solution .......................... 354
VIII. Ineffective or Unlikely Solutions for the Hmong's
P ligh t .................................................................................. 3 5 8
A. Problems with Holding the Lao Government and
Individual Actors Responsible for Genocide .............. 358
B. Problems with Holding the LPDR and Individual
Actors Responsible for Crimes against Humanity ...... 361
C. Judicial Forums: An Unlikely Remedy for the
Jungle H m ong ............................................................. 362
D. Non-Judicial Solutions: Withholding Aid and
Implementing Trade Embargoes and Travel
R estrictions .................................................................. 365
t I would like to thank the dedicated cite checkers and editors on the journal for all of
their hard work and for their dedication to my piece.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
E. Ineffective Solutions Specific to the Hmong
Aw aiting Repatriation ................................................. 368
IX . C onclusion ......................................................................... 368
I. Introduction
In the highest mountains of Laos exists a large population of
Hmong veteran soldiers who fought as American allies against
Communist forces within Laos during the Vietnam War.'
Although the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency funded and trained
the soldiers,2 who became known as the "Secret Army,"3 many of
those soldiers remained in Laos when the United States left the
region in 1975.' The Hmong veterans were then subjected to rule
and abuse by the very Communist forces against whom they
fought.' Many of the Hmong sought refuge in Thailand or
resettled into third countries.6 Others escaped to the jungles of
Laos and have never been able to rejoin society.7
The remaining veterans are no longer young or threatening;
generations have been born and have died in the very jungles to
which the members of the Secret Army escaped thirty-three years
ago. In fact, the "Jungle Hmong" are now made up mostly of
starving women and children.8 Another large group of Hmong
continues to seek asylum in Thailand and will likely face forcible
repatriation to Laos if the international community does not
intervene. Since the 1970s, both Hmong groups have experienced
horrific atrocities at the hands of the Lao Government, which
pledged in 1975 to "exterminate [the Hmong] to the root of the
I Thomas Fuller, Old U.S. Allies, Still Hiding Deep in Laos, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2007, at Al.
2 Brian W. Jacobs, No-Win Situation: The Plight of the Hmong - America's
Former Ally, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 139, 141-42 (1996).
3 John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II. The Unconstitutionality
of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1093, 1095 (1990).
4 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 143-44.
s Id. at 144.
6 Fuller, supra note 1.
7 Id.
8 Rum HAMID, THE FORGOTTEN HMONG HIDING IN THE JUNGLES OF LAOS 7 (2005),
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/hmong_r
uhi hamid_020905_/hmongruhihamid_020905_en.pdf.
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tribe." 9 This has led to attacks on the Jungle Hmong, a group that
now faces certain death if attacks continue. If repatriated, the
asylum-seeking Hmong face a similar fate.
While the Jungle Hmong and the asylum-seeking Hmong have
distinct issues, locations, and circumstances, they experience many
of the same grave breaches of basic human rights. Attacks on
either group threaten the safety and future of the Hmong in the
other group. Immediate families are split between the jungles in
Laos, the refugee camps in Thailand, and sometimes third
countries.1" Often a small group from the jungle is able to escape
to Thailand; sometimes the jungle groups surrender to Lao
authorities and later flee back to the jungle or to Thailand after
mistreatment by the Lao government." Because the groups are
often victimized in the same way and at times move between the
same locations, it is impossible to examine the situation without
discussing both groups.
This Comment will first briefly outline the long and complex
history of the Hmong's persecution in Laos. It will detail only a
few of the hundreds of reported attacks against the population of
Hmong that remain hiding in the jungles. The second section will
discuss refugee and asylum policies and the role of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Although it
is impossible to provide an account which could successfully
demonstrate the enormity of the situation, the history of the
Hmong seeking refuge in Thailand and stories of past and current
repatriations will be presented in some detail. Finally,
recommendations will be made for potentially viable solutions to
the ongoing human rights violations experienced by the Hmong.
In order to understand how the Hmong's struggle fits into current
international law, "solutions" that are likely to be ineffective or
impossible to implement are also discussed.
II. Who are the "Hmong?"
The Hmong are the third largest ethnic minority in Laos;
today, the estimated 450,000 Hmong in Laos constitute about
9 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 144.
10 Fuller, supra note 1.
I I MIDICINS SANS FRONTItRES, FEARING A FORCED RETURN 4 (2008).
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eight percent of its population. 2 Centuries ago, Hmong migrated
from China to various countries in Southeast Asia, including
Laos.13  Lao-Hmong, those Hmong whose ancestors settled in
Laos, are represented in all levels of the Lao administration,
though in very limited numbers.14 Thus, not all Hmong are being
persecuted, for many supported the Communist forces during the
Laotian Civil War and continue to support the government today.15
The Hmong referred to throughout this Comment are individuals
who were associated with the Secret Army and their relatives, and
are concentrated mostly in Lao jungles and makeshift refugee
camps in Thailand.
III. The CIA Funded "Secret Army"
The United States was involved in a "war against
Communism"' 6 throughout Indochina beginning in the 1950s. 7
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam were each struggling with
Communist forces: the Khmer Rouge, Pathet Lao, and Viet Cong
respectively. 8 The United States' reliance on the Hmong in Laos
began in late 1959 when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) met with Vang Pao, the military leader of a Royal Lao
Army Battalion, which was then fighting against the communist
insurgents.' 9 The CIA recruited Vang Pao to organize a small
fighting force made up of about 10,000 Hmong and promised to
supply the force with the necessary weapons.2"
In 1962, the United States and North Vietnam, along with
twelve other countries, signed an agreement in Geneva pledging
neutrality in Laos.2 After signing the agreement, the United
12 Amnesty Int'l, Lao People's Democratic Republic: Hiding in the Jungle. Hmong
Under Threat, Al Index ASA 26/003/2007, Mar. 2007, at 4 [hereinafter Amnesty Int'l
2007 Report].
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 5.
16 Ely, supra note 3, at 1093.
17 William M. Leary, CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974: Supporting the
"Secret War, " in 1999-2000 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE 71, 72.
18 Ely, supra note 3, at 1093.
19 Leary, supra note 17, at 77.
20 Id.
21 Ely, supra note 3, at 1094.
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States removed its 666 military advisors and staff from Laos and
stopped supplying weapons to the Hmong. 22 But this removal was
not the end of the United States' presence in Laos; by the time the
United States military left Indochina in 1973, it had dropped over
1.6 million tons of bombs on Laos.23 The United States dropped
more bombs on Laos during the Vietnam War than it dropped on
all of Europe during World War 11.24 In fact, the United States is
said to have dropped over 6.7 million tons of ordnance on
Indochina during this "war on Communism., 25 This amount is
roughly three times the total dropped on all enemy nations during
World War 11.26 While the war in Laos may be less widely known,
it certainly appears no less destructive than many previous wars.
To understand the current situation of the Hmong, it is important
to understand the history behind the war and the human rights
violations against the Hmong that followed.
Shortly after signing the 1962 Geneva Accord, the North
Vietnamese forces violated the agreement by establishing the Ho
Chi Minh trail, part of which ran through Laos.27  This trail
allowed North Vietnamese Army troops, who were fighting in
their own country, to establish supply routes in the apparent safety
of Laos. 28 The Kennedy administration, also in violation of the
neutrality agreement, responded by authorizing the CIA to
increase the size of Vang Pao's army.29 The army quickly reached
20,000 troops.3" The conflict escalated in 1964 as the Pathet Lao
forces, which had aligned themselves with the Viet Minh
Communist force in Vietnam,31 attacked the Lao right-wing
royalists and nationalists.3 2 Khoa-xane Pathet Lao, the official
mouthpiece of the Pathet Lao, demanded that the Hmong be
22 Leary, supra note 17, at 79.
23 Ely, supra note 3, at 1098.
24 THOMAS G. PATERSON, MEETING THE COMMUNIST THREAT: TRUMAN TO REAGAN
260 (1988).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 5; Ely, supra note 3, at 1094-95.
28 Ely, supra note 3, at 1094-95.
29 Leary, supra note 17, at 79.
30 Id.
31 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 141.
32 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 4; Leary, supra note 17, at 79.
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"exterminated down to the root of the tribe. 33
Vang Pao's "Secret Army" continued to grow, reaching some
40,000 troops at its peak. 34 The Army remained relatively covert
for a number of years until 1969 when news reports started
reaching the American public.35 Facing a North Vietnamese Army
with more than 67,000 troops, the CIA continued to fund, train,
and supply aircraft and weaponry to the Secret Army until 1973,
when American troops withdrew from Indochina after signing the
Paris Peace Accord.3 6  The cease-fire Agreement on the
Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos was signed a
month later, and by late 1975, the Communist Pathet Lao
controlled the Lao government.37  In December 1975, the
Communist party officially took control and the Kingdom of Laos
became the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR).38
The United States lost a total of 100 air personnel in Laos
during the period that the Secret Army fought.39 The death toll for
the CIA's Hmong soldiers reached 17,000,40 and an additional
50,000 Hmong civilians also perished.4
IV. The "Jungle Hmong"
After the Pathet Lao gained control, some 300,000 Hmong fled
the country in fear of government retribution.42 The United States
flew Vang Pao from Laos to Thailand,43 and then resettled him in
the United States." Many other veterans and their families sought
refuge in Thailand, and the majority of them eventually resettled
in other countries.45 The United States received about 250,000
33 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 144.
34 Id. at 142.
35 Leary, supra note 17, at 80.
36 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 142-43; Leary, supra note 17, at 82-83.
37 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 142-43.
38 Id. at 143.
39 Leary, supra note 17, at 83.
40 HAMID, supra note 8, at 4.
41 Id.
42 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 5.
43 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 143.
44 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 5.
45 Id.
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Hmong refugees between 1975 and 1996.46
A number of the Hmong that did not escape Laos were
arrested and put in "re-education" camps.47 Tens of thousands of
Hmong fled to the jungles of Laos to launch sporadic resistance
against the new Communist government.48 Reports of the LPDR
dropping chemical toxins on the Hmong in the jungles began
immediately.49 The Lao People's Army, joined by about 30,000
Vietnamese troops, successfully crushed much of the Hmong's
resistance during the first few years, but thousands of Hmong
remained in the jungle for fear of the military and the
government.5" These Hmong are sometimes referred to as the
"Jungle Hmong" 51 and are still hiding in the dense jungles of Laos
today.
The original group that fled to the jungle was largely made up
of Secret Army veterans and their immediate families; today the
remaining Jungle Hmong are mostly women and children.53 Few
of the Jungle Hmong alive today actually fought in the war against
the Communists.
54
Because so few journalists have been able to safely trek into
the jungles, it is difficult to determine exactly how many Hmong
are still hiding. 55 The U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, the capital of
Laos, estimates that anywhere from hundreds to a few thousand
Hmong are spread throughout the deep forests and remote
mountains of Laos.56 Other estimates reach 17,000.17 Accurate
population estimates are also hard to obtain because the entire
population of Jungle Hmong is split into groups and spread
46 Id.
47 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 143.
48 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 5.
49 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 144.
5o Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 5.
51 See, e.g., Jim Pollard, Hmong in Laos Afraid to Surrender, THE NATION
(Bangkok, Thail.), Jan. 23, 2008, para. 2.
52 See Fuller, supra note 1.
53 See HAMID, supra note 8, at 7.
54 Id.
55 Fuller, supra note 1. Only about twelve journalists have ever journeyed to the
jungles of Laos to visit the Hmong. Id.
56 Id.
57 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 6.
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throughout Laos in order to avoid detection." One Hmong group
leader showed a visiting journalist a document counting the
leader's group at 7,000 in 1975; all that remains of his group today
is 800 starving men, women, and children. 9
A. Lao Military Attacks on the Jungle Hmong
Several sources have reported frequent Lao military attacks on
the Jungle Hmong over the past thirty-three years.6" Footage of
the victims of a Lao military attack on a dozen boys and girls
gathering food in May 2004 reveals brutal rape, mutilation, and
disembowelment. 6' This report is just one of hundreds that have
been a constant concern to human rights advocates.62 Perhaps the
most publicized attack occurred on April 6, 2006.63 The Lao
military mutilated and slaughtered a group of twenty-six unarmed
Hmong as they foraged for food on the outskirts of their camp.64
Twenty-five of the twenty-six killed were women and children;
five infants later died from starvation because their mothers were
not alive to breast-feed them.65  Amnesty International and the
Fact Finding Commission (FFC)66 have obtained photographs and
videos documenting the aftermath of this massacre.67 In response
to inquiries from the UN and international humanitarian
organizations, the LPDR simply stated that the incident was a
58 Id.
59 See Andrew Perrin, Welcome to the Jungle, TIME, Apr. 28, 2003,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501030505-447253,00.html.
60 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 10; HAMID, supra note 8 passim;
Fuller, supra note 1 passim; Roger Arnold, Still a Secret War, THE DIGITAL JOURNALIST,
October 2006, http://www.digitaljournalist.org/issue0610/dis_arnold.html.
61 Online video: Bloody Wednesday (Fact Finding Comm'n 2004), available at
http://www.factfinding.org/media.html (follow "Broadband" hyperlink).
62 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
LAOS, 2006 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES § l(a) (2006); HAMID,
supra note 8, at 7.
63 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 11.
64 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 62, § 1(a).
65 Arnold, supra note 60, para. 16.
66 The Fact Finding Commission is a non-profit organization raising awareness of
the Hmong's plight in the United States. Welcome to the Jungle, http://www.fact
finding.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
67 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 62, § 1(a).
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fabrication. 68  In fact, the Lao government never conducted an
61investigation.
9
The U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices lists incident after incident of the LPDR military
killing Hmong who they believe were tied to the Secret Army.70
Many of these deaths occurred in the Saisomboun Special Zone, a
military administrative area where no U.N. or U.S. Embassy staff
can travel.71 In each of these cases, the LPDR denied involvement
and refused to investigate the allegations. In addition, the LPDR
prohibits most international humanitarian organizations from
entering the country.73 Without access, these agencies are also
unable to investigate these allegations.
B. Surrender Attempts by the Jungle Hmong
Due to the harsh jungle conditions, many Hmong feel that they
have little choice but to join Lao society; they are malnourished
and diseased, and cannot continue living in the jungles without
access to medical care.7 4  Throughout the years, many have
attempted to "surrender" to Lao authorities, hoping to reintegrate
into Lao society.75 There is no way to know how many Hmong
have surrendered, but estimates between June 2005 and December
2006 exceed 2,000.76 A few of these groups are reported to have
successfully integrated into Lao society with assistance from the
LPDR.77 Support is often much less than promised, but
implemented programs include job training and donations of land
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Request for Written Comments on the Extension of Permanent Normal Trade
Relations Status to Armenia, Moldova, and Laos Before the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Laura Xiong, Exec. Dir., Hmong Int'l Human
Rights Watch). Saisomboun is sometimes spelled "Xaysamboune." See, e.g., Amnesty
Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 9.
72 Jacobs, supra note 2 passim.
73 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 62, § 4.
74 See HAMID, supra note 8, at 8-10.
75 Pollard, supra note 51 passim.
76 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 62, § 2(d).
77 Id.
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and farming equipment.78 More often than not, however, the
groups that surrender simply disappear.
In stark contrast to the reintegration successes are alarming
reports of surrenders leading to detention and violence.79 For
example, when a group of 173 Hmong surrendered in June 2005,
the FFC attempted to organize an international presence to
monitor the resettlement of the group.8 ° At least three members of
the FFC managed to escape detection and were present, but due to
the ban on humanitarian presence, no other agencies were able to
provide assistance.8 When discovered, the FFC monitors were
detained and later deported for "illegally liaising" with the
relatives of Secret Army veterans.82  Amnesty International
reported that the LPDR military imprisoned the group of 173
Hmong in "appalling conditions" for six months.83 By the end of
the six months, the group was told that they could leave as
individual families, but not as a group.84 The Hmong left the
prison in the middle of the night and walked in different directions
as ordered.85 The fates of the families remain the subject of
debate, though there is speculation that several have sought refuge
in Thailand.8 6 The Lao Vientiane Times newspaper reported that
the government resettled the Hmong and provided them with food,
money, medical attention, materials for home construction, and
land for rice cultivation.87 These claims cannot be substantiated
and the Lao government "has publicly denied all reports that have
emerged" about the status of the group.88
In October 2006, a group of about 350 Hmong surrendered in
78 Id. § 5.
79 Pollard, supra note 51 passim.
80 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 16-17.
81 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 62, § 5.
82 FREEDOM HOUSE, UNCHR REFWORLD, Freedom in the World 2008 - Laos, July
2, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/487ca21ec.html.
83 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 17. According to an anonymous
eyewitness account, two children in the group died of malnourishment while imprisoned,
thus reducing the group to 171. Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 18.
87 HAMID, supra note 8, at 11.
88 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 18.
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the Lao province of Vientiane.89 Two months later, a group of
more than 400 surrendered in the Xiang ° Khouang Province.91
There were no reports of violence against these two particular
groups, but the government denied access to international
monitors, refusing to reintegrate the Hmong into society in a
transparent way.92 The status and welfare of these two groups and
many others remain unknown.93
C. Jungle Conditions Documented by Visiting Journalists
The few journalists who managed the trek into the jungles
have published numerous articles, taken hundreds of photos, and
recorded hours of video which have been made into various
documentaries. Independent third parties have authenticated most,
if not all, of these materials.94 The Lao government continually
denies any attacks on Hmong living in the jungle, dismissing
claims as "fabrication." 95
The trek into the jungle is incredibly dangerous. In 2003,
Andrew Perrin, a writer for TIME Magazine, was following his
Jungle Hmong escorts on their ninth day of trekking through the
foliage when LPDR troops spotted them and began firing rounds
at the group. After lying on the dense jungle floor for hours, they
were able to hike out of the area without further incident.96
Teams of reporters and journalists who successfully enter the
jungle do not always leave the jungle safely. In June 2003, two
European journalists, based in Bangkok, visited the jungle with a
Hmong-American interpreter and three ethnic Lao-Hmong
nationals.97 When the group emerged from the jungle, they were
89 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 62, § 5.
90 Xiang is sometimes spelled "Xieng." See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, Lao People's
Democratic Republic: Thao Moua and Pa Fue Khang: Hmong Imprisoned After Unfair
Trial, Al Index ASA 26/008/2007, June 2007, at 1 [hereinafter Unfair Trial].
91 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 62, § 5.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 HAMID, supra note 8, at 7.
95 Luisetta Mudie, Lao Troops Told 'Shoot to Kill' Hmong Rebels, RADIO FREE
ASIA, Feb. 8, 2008, para. 5, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/hmong-20080208.ht
tml.See infra text accompanying notes 125-32.
96 Perrin, supra note 59, para. 1.
97 Unfair Trial, supra note 90, at 1.
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arrested; one of the Lao-Hmong nationals escaped to Thailand to
seek refuge and was later resettled in a third country.98 The Lao
government detained the others, and tried and sentenced them that
same month in a hearing that lasted just three hours.99 Though
represented by their respective embassies, the journalists and the
American-Hmong interpreter received sentences between ten and
twenty years each.' The embassies and the Lao government
eventually negotiated a settlement for the release of the foreign
nationals, but the two Lao-Hmong remain in prison today.'' The
LPDR retained the journalists' notes, videos, and photographs." 2
Journalists who make the dangerous trek into the jungles
organize the trip through an underground network of
"blackbirds."'0 3  These Hmong blackbirds arrange for a small
group of men and boys to meet the foreign team and safely escort
them to the Hmong "camps" in the jungle. Because the Hmong
groups move at least once a month to avoid detection, they have
no permanent structures set up in the jungles.0 4 The Hmong are
unable to cultivate food without being detected and attacked, so
they survive on little more than foraged cassava roots and boiled
palm tree leaves. 5 The children have distended bellies due to
malnourishment and are often without clothes. Although they trek
over rugged mountains, the Hmong typically have only plastic flip
flops for footwear. For protection from attacks, they still carry the
rusted weapons and ragged packs provided by the CIA in the
1960s. They dig up ammunition from former U.S. air bases but
estimate that only one third of the rounds are live.0 6 Journalists
who have visited the Hmong confirm that the groups present no
military threat to the LPDR.'0 7 This observation is important
98 Id.
99 Id.
oo Id. at 2.
10, Id.
102 Id.
103 HAMID, supra note 8, at 5. Blackbirds are a "loose network" of people who
assist journalists in locating the Hmong groups in the jungle, through communication on
satellite phones given by the FFC. Id.
104 Id. at 6.
105 Id. at 9.
106 Perrin, supra note 59, para. 9.
107 HAMID, supra note 8, at 9.
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observation because if the Hmong are considered to be a threat to
national security, the Lao government may argue that they are
justified in using force against them.
Each journalist has reported multiple injuries among the men,
women, and children living in the jungle. Documented injuries
range from three-decade-old scars to recent shrapnel wounds and
gunshot wounds.10 8  In 2003, Communist Lao troops shot one
Jungle Hmong boy, Tong Hua Her, in the face.'0 9 As a result,
Tong is missing half of his face; his right eye is almost completely
deformed and his entire nasal cavity is exposed."0 Well-known
photojournalist Roger Arnold photographed Tong and others
during a June 2006 visit to the jungle."' About his arrival Arnold
wrote: "After 72 hours of climbing we reached their hidden
village, where I found the saddest place I have ever seen. Before
me on hands and knees were hundreds of men, women, and
children crying and screaming for me to save their lives from
Communist soldiers." ' 12 Arnold documented the remains of the
April 2006 massacre in which Tong's group lost twenty-six
members to the LPDR military attack." 3
Many of the Hmong children suffer from deformities and
blindness due to chemicals military forces drop into the jungle."4
The Hmong can only identify the chemicals by color and
recognize that the black chemical is the worst."5 The Hmong have
described the horror of death by these chemicals to journalists." 16
Often, a victim will become paralyzed after eating a plant covered
in the chemicals."17 Most contact with these chemicals results in
death; "after they die, their tongue sticks out," notes one Hmong
leader." 8 In addition, the military once surrounded vegetation
108 Id.
109 See Arnold, supra note 60.
110 Id.
IlII Id.
112 Id. para. 12-13.
113 Id. para. 16. See supra text accompanying notes notes 63-69.
114 See Online video: Beyond the Mekong (Fact Finding Comm'n 2001),
http://www.factfinding.org/media.html (follow "Broadband" hyperlink).
1"5 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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with landmines in order to kill the women and children foraging
for food."9  Similar reports of bombings have been made
consistently throughout the thirty-three years that the Hmong have
been hiding.
In an interview with The New York Times, sixty-year-old
Secret Army veteran Va Chang requested "America to give [the
Hmong] a place to live. We want America to give us food and
medicine.""12 He then pled, "If the Americans don't want to do
that, they should drop a big bomb on us and end our misery."12'
Many of the other Hmong living in constant fear of the military
share Va Chang's attitude. 22
Journalists have provided the Hmong with satellite phones and
occasional video cameras to document abuses. 23 Many group
leaders keep lists of the names and ages of the Hmong attacked
and report these incidents by phone to humanitarian organizations
overseas.'24 FFC receives a number of reports, the most recent
being a list of the names of seventy-one people who died between
January 15 and February 10, 2008.125 The Hmong on the list
ranged in age from one to seventy-eight.126 Military troops killed
twenty-two of them; the remaining forty-nine died from
starvation. 127
Since 2007, the LPDR military has become more aggressive in
its attacks on the Jungle Hmong. 128  Although government
authorities publicly deny the existence of the Jungle Hmong, the
government has given "shoot to kill" orders and has offered
membership in the Communist Party and the equivalent of a U.S.
$600 reward for each Jungle Hmong body brought out of the
119 Id.
120 Fuller, supra note 1.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Arnold, supra note 60, para. 4.
124 Id.
125 News Release, Fact Finding Comm'n, The Killing Fields Revisited (Feb. 15,
2008), http://www.factfinding.org (follow "News Releases" hyperlink; then follow "The
Killing Fields Revisited" hyperlink) (hereinafter Killing Fields Revisited].
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Mudie, supra note 95, para. 4; Killing Fields Revisited, supra note 125, para. 1.
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forest. 129 The government also requested the help of the
Vietnamese Intelligence Service to use modem technological
devices to detect the location of the Hmong's satellite phones. 3 '
The Vietnamese Intelligence Service, stationed in Nong Tang,
Laos, maintains a fagade as a scrap metal business while reporting
information on Jungle Hmong whereabouts to the Lao officials.'
It seems that the LPDR is intent on carrying out its 1975
pledge to eliminate the Hmong. 3 2 U.S. Embassy Spokesperson
Amy Archibald says that the United States "find[s] these reports
very credible" and "know[s] that there are human rights abuses by
security forces."'33 She comments that the situations are difficult
to fully analyze because no one knows "who fired the first
bullet."' 3 4 LPDR Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yong Chanthala-
ngsy simply states: "There are no Hmong CIA in the jungles.
There are no clashes. As you may notice by traveling in our
country, there is a peaceful atmosphere."' 35  Comments such as
these are also helpful in assessing whether the LPDR truly
considers the Hmong a security threat.
V. The Lao-Hmong in Thailand
A. The Status of the Asylum-Seeking Hmong
In order to qualify for international asylum protection, the
Hmong must be considered refugees under international law.
According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Convention), a "refugee" is a person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself on the protection of that
129 Mudie, supra note 95, para. 4; Killing Fields Revisited, supra note 125, para. 1.
130 Mudie, supra note 95, para. 13; Killing Fields Revisited, supra note 125, para. 1.
131 Mudie, supra note 95, para. 13.
132 Killing Fields Revisited, supra note 125, para. 1.
133 Fuller, supra note 1.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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country...136
Since the Jungle Hmong are within the borders of Laos, they
do not qualify for protection as "refugees." Only those Hmong
seeking asylum in Thailand may qualify for refugee status. The
Convention prohibits expulsion or return (called
"nonrefoulement") "in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where [the refugee's] life or freedom would be
threatened .... 137
While Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention or its
1967 Protocol, customary international law also recognizes the
principle of nonrefoulement and binds all countries, regardless of
ratification status, to this principle. 138 Customary international law
is a set of principles so fundamental that most countries in the
world accept and abide by their terms.1 39  It generally includes
crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. 1
40
In addition, as a party to the United Nations, Thailand must
abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and respect
basic rights afforded to every person. 4' Rights delineated in this
declaration include "the right to life, liberty, and security of
person,"1 42 and the right not to be "subjected to torture or to cruel,
136 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 art. 1 (A)(2) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees]. The original text of the Convention required the refugee to have a
well-founded fear based on events occurring before January 1951. Id. Because of the
need to address new refugee situations, the 1967 protocol allowed acceding States to
apply the substantive provisions of the convention without date limitations. Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, art.
1(2).
137 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 136, at art. 33.
138 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 24.
139 Parry & Grant Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law 109 (John P. Grant
& J. Craig Barker eds., Oceana Publications, Inc. 2d ed. 2004).
140 Id.
141 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A, at 14(1), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration of Human Rights].
142 Id. at art. 3. Interestingly, Thailand's new Constitution, adopted in 2007,
contains a section on individual liberty titled "Rights and freedoms of the Thai people,"
excluding non-Thais. See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, UNCHR
REFWORLD, World Refugee Survey 2008, June 19, 2008,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/485f50d6c.html.
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inhuman or degrading treatment." 143 Humanitarian agencies have
urged Thailand to recognize these fundamental principles in
determining a solution for the Hmong. 1
44
The UNHCR has determined three "durable solutions" to
permanently end refugees' suffering and need for international
protection and assistance: (1) voluntary repatriation, (2) local
integration into the country of first asylum (in this case, Thailand),
or (3) resettlement in a third country. 14' The international
community, countries of origin (in this case, Laos), and countries
of asylum generally agree that voluntary repatriation is the most
desirable of the three solutions. 46 Although refugees do return to
the country from which they fled persecution, many repatriation
movements, when paired with post-conflict reconstruction, are
successful.147 The 2004 UNHCR Executive Committee noted that
"it is crucial to ensure that appropriate levels of security, social
services, and economic opportunity are available to returnees.
' 148
Thailand considers the asylum-seeking Hmong illegal
immigrants because they violated the Thai Immigration Act when
they entered the country. 49 As illegal immigrants, the Hmong are
subject to imprisonment, fines, and expulsion. 5 ° Like Laos,
Thailand will not allow international humanitarian agencies to
assist with the Hmong situation within their country.' 1 Were the
1951 Convention to apply, Thailand would be prohibited from
"impos[ing] penalities, on account of their illegal entry or
143 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 141, at art. 5.
144 See generally Oratai Singhananth, UN Urges Thailand to Free Lao Hmong, RADIO
FREE ASIA, Jan. 15, 2008, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/lao_ hmong-
20080115.html [hereinafter Singhananth, UN Urges Thailand].
145 OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S
REFUGEES: HUMAN DISPLACEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 129 (Nada Meheb et al.
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
146 Id. at 130.
147 Id. at 133. After a fourteen-year civil war in Liberia, the UNHCR, with the
assistance of NGOs, the Liberian Transitional Government, and neighboring refugee host
states, successfully returned over 320,000 refugees to their country of origin. Id. at 133-
34.
148 Id. at 133.
149 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 143.
150 Id.
151 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 62, § 5.
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presence, on refugees." '52  Unfortunately, because Thailand has
not ratified the Convention and will not allow the UNHCR to
evaluate the Hmong claims of persecution, most Hmong in
Thailand are not considered refugees by the legal definition; they
are asylum seekers. Though there is no specific framework in the
Convention for the treatment of asylum seekers, the
nonrefoulement provision and the penalty provision quoted
directly above are both applicable to refugees before formal
determination (when they are considered asylum seekers) and at
the point of recognition as refugees. 53
B. History ofAsylum-Seeking Hmong and Refugee Camps in
Thailand
Refugee camps in Thailand have a long and checkered history.
After the change in Lao government, Thailand experienced a great
influx of Lao-Hmong seeking asylum.'54 The Thai government
allowed the UNHCR to set up temporary refugee camps to provide
care to the Hmong.' 55 Although the Thai government officially
listed these asylum seekers as illegal immigrants, the UNHCR was
able to establish refugee status for many of them.156
The U.S. government announced that it would take 168,000
refugees from Indochina in the year 1979, but Thailand was still
left with more than 250,000 refugees and asylum seekers from
Laos and other countries.'57 In order to dissuade more Hmong
from entering, Thailand set up a camp with poor living conditions
and allowed no chance for resettlement to third countries. 58 The
United States also tried to slow the influx of refugees by passing
the Refugee Act of 1980, which provided resettlement approval on
a case-by-case basis only.'59 The 27,000 Hmong admitted in 1980
152 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 136, at art. 33.
153 U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Global Consultations on Int'l Protection,
Reception of Asylum-Seekers, Including Standards of Treatment, in the Context of
Individual Asylum Systems, U.N. Doc. EC/GC/01/ 17 (Sept. 4, 2001).
154 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 143.
155 id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 144.
158 Id.
159 See 8 U.S.C. § 1522 (2000).
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dropped to just 3,800 in 1981.160 Those hoping for resettlement to
the United States also faced strict drug laws requiring refugees to
be free from drug use for five years prior to entry.161 Prior poicT
required refugees to be free from drug use for only six months.
The Hmong regularly used opium for medicinal purposes because
they often lacked access to other medicine; thus, the United States
excluded many of the Hmong from the resettlement process.
163
The United States also experienced a decrease in refugees due
to external factors. Those awaiting resettlement in Thailand heard
that Hmong in the United States were among the most welfare-
dependent groups in the country. 164  Also, from his home in the
United States, former Secret Army leader Vang Pao instructed the
Hmong to remain in Thailand in hopes that his efforts would
assure them a safe return to Laos.
165
Thailand continued to experience an increase in asylum-
seekers and with the help of UNHCR, Canada, and the United
States, established a screening process in order to determine each
Hmong's status. 166 Individuals who were determined to be
refugees were sent to a barren camp, and those who were found to
have entered the country for other reasons, namely economic
concerns, were sent to a detention center to await repatriation. 167
Thailand also distinguished those Hmong with relatives in third
countries, perhaps indicating that the Thai government was only
willing to temporarily house those it could easily resettle.1
68
Thailand's screening process contained several flaws. Many
Hmong reported bribing officials with 2,000-36,000 Thai baht1
69
160 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 145.
161 Id.
162 id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. Vang Pao tried to aid the Hmong in their resistance efforts even from his
home in California for years after his resettlement in the US. Id. In June 2007, Vang
Pao and nine others were arrested and charged with plotting to overthrow the Lao
government. See CNN, 10 Charged with Alleged Laos Plot, CNN, June 4, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/06/04/laos.arrests/index.html?iref-newssearch.
166 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 145.
167 Id. at 146.
168 Id. at 145-46.
169 At the time of writing, 2,000-36,000 Thai baht is roughly equivalent to U.S. $58
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in order to enter the process or to gain refugee status. 7' As early
as 1989, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 7' reported
that "screening [was] conducted in a haphazard manner with little
concern for legal norms. Extortion and bribery [were]
widespread."'72 Eventually, the situation turned violent as asylum-
seekers had their money confiscated, were shot at as they tried to
enter Thailand, or were forced back to Laos where they risked
being gunned down and killed by the Pathet Lao.' 73
By 1991, UNHCR and the Lao and Thai governments, with
support and financial assistance from the United States, signed the
Luang Prabang Tripartite Agreement.'74 The Agreement provided
for the closing of all refugee camps and repatriation of all Hmong
from Thailand to Laos by the end of 1994.' The official position
of the Lao government at the time was that of reconciliation, yet
authorities admitted that many government officials still resented
the Hmong, and the government refused to accept refugees whom
the Thai government had previously screened out.'76
Since many of the Hmong remained unwilling to return to
Laos, the United States recruited a well-respected Hmong leader to
return first in hopes that other Hmong would follow.'77 This plan
was also unsuccessful. Vue Mai, a former major in the Secret
Army, was repatriated in November 1992 with the promise of a
safe return; his clan assured him that they would follow after he
to $1053. See Reuters, Currency Converter, http://ww.reuters.com/finance/currencies
(last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
170 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 146.
171 The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights is now called Human Rights First.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, Human Rights First is the New Name of the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, Jan. 30, 2004, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org
/aboutus/name change/name change.htm.
172 Hmong Refugees Fear Forced Repatriation, THE NATION (Bangkok, Thail.),
Dec. 4, 1994, available at http://www.hurmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/J99412/msg
00025.html.
173 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 147. At least two separate incidents of this type were
reported. The first involved the killing of thirty-two Hmong asylum seekers. One eight-
year-old Hmong girl was shot but survived. In the second incident, all sixteen asylum
seekers were killed. Id.
174 Hmong Refugees Fear Forced Repatriation, supra note 172.
175 Jacobs, supra note 2, at 147.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 148.
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was favorably resettled.178 Ten months after returning to Laos,
Vue Mai was reported missing. 79 The LPDR claimed that he ran
off with a girlfriend, but the Hmong refused to believe this
explanation, given that the LPDR had assigned an officer to follow
and watch after Vue Mai. 8 ' After Vue Mai's repatriation, despite
his mysterious disappearance, involuntary repatriations to Laos
were completed with greater frequency.18" ' United States and
UNHCR officials said that they would consider forcibly
repatriating reluctant Hmong if necessary.'82 Thousands of
repatriations occurred in the early 1990s, and by the end of 1994
all but one camp had been closed in Thailand.183 It seemed that the
problem of Lao-Hmong in Thailand was almost resolved.
Yet in May 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
House Resolution 402, which outlined a stance critical of Laos and
sympathetic to the Hmong. 8 4 Shortly thereafter, the United States
government agreed to allow more Hmong entry into the United
States, 85 and as a result, about 15,000 refugees from Thailand
resettled in the United States in June 2004.186 Immediately,
perhaps encouraged by the U.S. resettlements, a wave of 4,000 to
5,000 Lao Hmong fled across the Mekong River into Huay Nam
Khao, Thailand, to seek refuge.'87 Once inside Thailand, many of
the Hmong lived on the edges of the forest near the village and
received food and assistance from local Thai residents.'88 Others
178 Id.
179 Id.
i8o Id. at 148-49.
181 The Lao and Thai governments considered these returns to be "voluntary," as
forced repatriation violates the principle of nonrefoulement, but in reality many of the
Hmong were given only the choice to return or face indefinite "prison-like detention."
Jacobs, supra note 2, at 149.
182 Id. at 150.
183 Id. at 149.
184 See H.R. Res. 402, 108th Cong. (2004).
185 Lionel Rosenblatt, Hmong Refugees Arrive in U. S.: The Latest Chapter in a
Long Odyssey, REFUGEES INT'L, Aug. 11, 2004, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/
content/article/detail/3147.
186 Id.
187 MtD1CINS SANS FRONTIERES, supra note 11, at 3.
188 Id.
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worked on nearby farms or traded resources at the local market.189
In June of 2005, Thai officials forced the Hmong to leave the
forests and pressured the Thai residents to stop helping the asylum
seekers. 90  The United States made arrangements to resettle
another group of a few thousand Hmong but later decided it was
unable to resettle those refugees.' 9' Still more Hmong may have
been encouraged to flee to Thailand by news of the possible
resettlement arrangements.
The humanitarian agency Mdecins Sans Fronti~res (MSF)192
learned of the makeshift refugee camp in July 2005 and visited the
town to assess the situation.'93 By that time, 5,000 to 6,000
Hmong were living on both sides of the main road. 94  Food,
shelter, safe drinking water, and medical care were all in short
supply.' 95 MSF set up an outpatient clinic in the makeshift camp
and by 2007 over 7,800 asylum-seekers inhabited what is known
as the Ban Huay Nam Khao camp. 196
C. Repatriation Efforts Since 2004
Repatriation efforts after 2004 have also had devastating
consequences for the Hmong. Since November 2004, Thailand
has forcibly repatriated over 400 asylum-seeking Hmong to Laos.
Approximately fifty can be accounted for; the whereabouts of the
others are unknown. 197
In December 2005, Thailand forcibly repatriated a group of
189 Id.
190 Id.
19' Oratai Singhananth, Missing Lao Hmong Girls Back in Thailand, Lao Official
Says, RADIO FREE ASIA, June 30, 2006, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/lao-hmong
-20070630.html-09202007210221.html [hereinafter Singhananth, Missing Lao Hmong
Girls].
192 M6decins Sans Fronti~res is also known as "Doctors Without Borders."
MiDECINS SANS FRONTItRES/DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://www.doctorswithout
borders.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
193 MDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, supra note 11, at 3.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Supalak Ganjanakhundee, Laos Insists to Take Hmong, THE NATION (Bangkok,
Thail.), Aug. 31, 2007, available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/08/31/regio
nalregional_30047327.php.
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twenty-eight Hmong, predominantly comprised of children.'98
The Thai government confirmed that it had unofficially deported
the group, but Lao officials refused to openly acknowledge the
presence of the group, although they privately indicated that they
were holding the Ilmong within Laos. 9 9 Later, Lao authorities
denied ever holding the group or knowing of its whereabouts.0 °
In the 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the U.S.
Department of State noted that multiple sources indicated that the
Lao government held the children in government detention
facilities since their repatriation in 2005.2°1 The reports indicate
that the Lao government held the boys in Vientiane and later
transferred them to a detention facility in Phongsaly.2 °2 The
government detained the girls at a prison attached to an army base
outside of another town in Laos. 2°3  In March of 2007, Lao
officials reported that they "found" the girls in the country and
released them to their relatives soon thereafter.0 4 Of the twenty-
one girls released to relatives, twelve fled back to Thailand in May
to reunite with their parents. 2 5  The girls told the MSF team of
repeated rape, beatings, and other abuse during their detention in
Laos.20 6 The whereabouts of the six boys and one adult are still
unknown.0 7
A group of fifty-three Hmong repatriated on November 15,
2006 are also missing.20 8 Lao official media previously reported
198 The exact composition of the group is uncertain. One source lists one adult and
twenty-seven children. Singhananth, Missing Lao Hmong Girls, supra note 191, para. 7.
Another source lists five adults and twenty-two children. Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report,
supra note 12, at 18. Yet another source lists the entire group as children. MtDECINS
SANS FRONTIERES, supra note 11, at 4.
199 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, supra note 62, § 2.
200 Id.
201 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, supra note 62, § 2(d).
202 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 18.
203 Id.
204 Singhananth, Missing Lao Hmong Girls, supra note 191.
205 MDECINS SANS FRONTIRES, supra note 11, at 4.
206 Id. MSF is the only international humanitarian agency that has been allowed to
provide medical and relief assistance to the Lao Hmong refugee population in Huai Nam
Khao in recent years. Id.
207 Singhananth, Missing Lao Hmong Girls, supra note 191.
208 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Thailand: Stop Deportation of Hmong
Refugees to Laos (Dec. 12, 2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/1 2/thailal4822 -
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that the returnees would undergo "re-education," a fate that has
included detention, starvation, forced labor, torture, and other ill-
treatment. °9  International humanitarian organizations remain
concerned about these returnees.
Later in November 2006, Thai police arrested 153 UNHCR-
recognized Hmong refugees who escaped from the Ban Huay Nam
Khao camp.21 ° In December, Thai officials moved the detainees
from Bangkok to an immigration center in Nong Khai, where they
remain today.21' Ninety of the detainees are children, 1 2 and the
number of current refugees detained is 154 due to the birth of an
infant while in detention.213 Thailand had hoped to repatriate the
group in January 2007 but delayed the attempt because of
international pressure21 4 and resistance by the refugees.21 5 On the
day of planned repatriation, Thai officials drove the women and
children to the Lao border where they awaited the arrival of their
male relatives; however the men at the detention center had
barricaded themselves inside their cells. 216 After attempting to saw
through the bars and emitting a gas-like substance into the cells,
detention officials stopped the deportation.2 17 Thai authorities said
that they would not deport the Hmong against their will and
"pledged to agree" to allow resettlement in third countries.218
Although multiple countries have agreed to take the refugees,
Thailand has still not released them, perhaps in order to discourage
txt.htm [hereinafter Stop Deportation of Hmong Refugees].
209 Id.
210 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 25. According to another source,
Thai police arrested 149 refugees. See Singhananth, UN Urges Thailand, supra note 144.
211 Singhananth, Missing Lao Hmong Girls, supra note 191, para. 5.
212 Press Release, United Nations, UNHCR Calls for Lao Hmong Refugees to be
Released After Hunger Strike, para. 2, (Aug. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/46c97f5f4.html [hereinafter UNHCR Calls for
Release].
213 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 25.
214 See, e. g. , Press Release, Lao Human Rights Council, Hmong Lao in Nong Khai
Detention Centre Appeal for Justice and Human Rights from Thai Government (Aug. 16,
2007), http://www.laohumanrightscouncil.org.
215 UNHCR Calls for Release, supra note 212, para. 5.
216 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, suprd note 12, at 25.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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other asylum-seekers from entering Thailand.21 9
D. Current State of Lao-Hmong Repatriation
In May of 2007, Thailand and Laos signed the Lao-Thai
Committee on Border Security agreement, allowing Thailand to
repatriate the 7,700 Hmong currently seeking asylum at the Ban
Huay Nam Khao camp and those held in the Nong Khai
Immigration Detention Center.22 ° Immediately after signing the
agreement, Thailand repatriated a group of thirty-one Hmong.22'
In early June, Thailand forced another 163 asylum seekers back to
Laos. 2 2  An unknown source in Laos reported to Hmong
International Human Rights Watch that the LPDR had integrated
the group of 163 into Palak Village, a development of houses built
by the LPDR for returning Hmong. 2 3 This report has not been
confirmed, but seems encouraging.
In September 2007, Laos and Thailand announced their
intention to repatriate all Hmong from the Thai camps by the end
of 2008.224 During the first seven months of 2008, Thailand
repatriated 1,362 Hmong to Laos, including one group of 837 in
June. 225 Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont said that without
firm action, the Hmong would be a "never ending problem.' '2 6 An
219 Ganjanakhundee, supra note 197. The Hmong remain in detention as of August
2008. Id.
220 See Press Release, M~decins Sans Fronti~res, MSF Calls on Thailand to Halt
Forcible Return of Hmong Refugees to Laos (Oct. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/release.cfm?id=2131.
221 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Thailand: Protect Hmong Refugees, Aug. 30, 2007,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/08/30/thailal6778.htm [hereinafter Protect Hmong
Refugees].
222 Id.
223 HMONG INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Hmong Returnees Moved to a
New Location, Dec. 3, 2007, http://www.hmongihrw.org/index.php?option=comcontent
&task=view&id = 136&Itemid=34.
224 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Thailand: Stop Forced Returns to Laos,
(Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47d658dbc.html.
225 Nearly 400 More Hmong Return to Laos from Thailand, Reports UN Agency,
U.N. DAILY NEWS, July 11, 2008, available at http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdfenglish/
2008/11072008.pdf, Thailand sends Lao Hmong home, RADIO FREE ASIA, June 4, 2008,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/484912938.html; United States Committee for
Refugees and Immigrants, supra note 142.
226 Hmong to be Sent Back to Laos, BANGKOK POST, 2007, available at
http://www.bangkokpost.com/topstories/topstories.php?id=121873.
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observer noted that the two governments are intent on repatriating
the Hmong "no matter how many bullet wounds they have." '227 As
part of the negotiation, Laos required that Thailand exclude third
party assistance and monitoring.228 Since the UNHCR's mandate
expired in 2001, Laos and Thailand have prohibited the
organization from determining Hmong refugee status and aiding
with reintegration into Lao society. 229 The Lao-Thai repatriation
agreement will guarantee that the UNHCR remains excluded from
the process.
Still categorizing the asylum-seeking Hmong as illegal
immigrants, the Thai government does not believe that repatriation
violates international law.230 Thai officials announced that they
would screen the Hmong before sending them back to Laos in case
any qualify for protective status.23' Unfortunately, since that
announcement, they have stated that all Hmong would be sent
back to Laos without the option of resettlement in third
countries.232 Considering the more than 1,300 repatriations since
January 2008, the latter policy seems probable. To date, more
than five industrialized countries, including the United States,
Canada, and Australia, have offered to accept some of the refugees
from Thailand. 233 A number of the Hmong at the Ban Huay Nam
Khao camp have official refugee status, dating from pre-2001
UNHCR assessments.234  Many are photographed with their
documents identifying them as refugees. Other Hmong have
produced tattered photos and papers proving their participation in
the Secret Army, in hopes that with this proof, Thailand will
award them refugee status.2 35  Human Rights Watch called this
resettlement refusal "brazen contempt for the most basic principles
of refugee law., 236  Prime Minister Surayud announced his
227 Songrit Pongern, Hmong Vow to Resist Repatriation to Laos, REUTERS, June 13,
2007.
228 MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, supra note 11, at 2.
229 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 62, § 4.
230 MEDECINS SANS FRONTItRES, supra note 11, at 2.
231 Id. at 1.
232 Id. at 1-2.
233 Protect Hmong Refugees, supra note 221.
234 Id.
235 Fuller, supra note 1.
236 Hmong to be Sent Back to Laos, supra note 226.
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intention to "continue" cooperation with the international
community on the basis of "transparency, democratic values, and
an adherence to international law--especially the UN Charter and
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights." '237 Any recent
cooperation with the international community has not included the
presence of monitors.
In routine medical and psychological assessments, MSF has
found "extreme fear and psychological distress among [the
Hmong] population, which has only been exacerbated by the threat
of a return to Laos." '238 The agency also reports that many Hmong
have physical scars and injuries, allegedly from abuses in Laos, 239
and states that "it's clear that the wounds are recent and caused by
guns. 24°
Reports indicate that Lao officials visited the Hmong in the
Ban Huay Nam Khao camp in August 2007 in order to show a
documentary illustrating the treatment of previous returnees.
2 41
Since some of the Hmong have been living in Thailand for over
three decades, the Lao government is preparing homes for the
Hmong who sold their property or have no relatives in Laos.242
Laos reportedly invited foreign officials and journalists to the Kasi
district to see the new facilities built for the returning refugees.243
To date, journalists have not published anything about those
facilities, perhaps because of delays in reporting, or, more
discouragingly, because the government has not upheld the
invitation.
Regardless of the efforts to calm those at the refugee camp,
many Hmong still vehemently resist repatriation. In February
2008, Thai authorities rounded up a group of thirteen Hmong and
dragged them onto trucks. 24  Some Hmong reportedly clung to
branches and bushes and had to be pulled free.24 When two men
237 Stop Deportation of Hmong Refugees, supra note 208.
238 MtDECNS SANS FRONTIjIRES, supra note 11, at 1.
239 Id.
240 Fuller, supra note 1.
241 Ganjanakhundee, supra note 197.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Sarah Jackson-Han, Thai Soldiers Forced Lao Hmong Back to Laos, Radio Free
Asia, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/lao hmong-20080228.html.
245 id.
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jumped out of the moving truck to avoid repatriation, Thai soldiers
sent police dogs after them; the police dogs severely mauled the
two men, resulting in hospitalization.246 The Thai government
claimed that the group of Hmong volunteered and willingly
returned to Laos, but as Human Rights Watch pointed out,
"volunteers don't need police dogs to coax them onto trucks. '2 47
Two other refugees were hospitalized after reportedly poisoning
themselves in fear of repatriation.248 Another source said that they
had not poisoned themselves, but that Thai authorities beat them
after they refused to sign papers consenting to return. 49
In late June 2008, 5,000 Hmong refugees left Huay Nam Khao
in a mass protest march to Bangkok. The Thai army set up a
roadblock and deported 837 Hmong back to Laos. About 3,700
returned to the camp the following day, but 1,300 are still
missing.
VI. Lao Government
The LPDR is one of only five Communist governments in
existence today.25' Laos ranks 130 out of 177 countries on the
UNDP Human Development Index,252 and in the bottom twelve in
the Reporters without Borders Worldwide Press Freedom Index2 53
and the Heritage Foundation/The Wall Street Journal Index of
Economic Freedom. 4  These three indices measure various
country conditions and are used as a frame of reference to assist in
social and economic development.
246 Id
247 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Thailand: Stop Forced Returns to Laos, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Mar. 5, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47d658dbc.html.
248 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, supra note 142.
249 Id.
250 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Thailand: End Mistreatment and Deportation of Lao
Hmong, July 11, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/07/l /thaila 9340.htm.
251 Central Intelligence Agency, The 2008 World Factbook, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
252 U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report Office, Human
Development Report 2007/2008, at 231.
253 Press Release, Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index
(Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/index_2007_en.pdf.
254 The Heritage Foundation, 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, (2008),
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/pdf/Index2008-ExecSum.pdf,
at 13.
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In 1991, Laos approved a Constitution detailing the country's
rule of law, but years later, the legal framework is yet to be
established.255 The result, as the government admitted, is "the
absence of uniformity and consistency in the application of the
law. ' 256  The government controls the media and mass
organizations,257 prohibits domestic nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) from forming, and allows few international
development NGOs to provide food and other assistance to
Hmong who accept resettlement offers.258 The government only
sporadically responds to international human rights organizations
requesting information about human rights practices in Laos." 9
Perhaps most detrimental for the Hmong is that Laos prohibits
access of independent human rights monitors.26 ° If Thailand
repatriates the Hmong to Laos, they will be subject to the Lao
government without third party monitors. Without transparency, it
is likely that the torture, rape, and detention of Hmong, as reported
in the past, will only continue.
Lao government restricts its citizens' freedom of speech,
assembly, religion, and political opposition or efforts to change the
government.261 During the 1989 election, the first since the
establishment of the LPDR, Laos allowed only those candidates
approved by the communist Lao People's Revolutionary Party
(LPRP) to seek office.262  Elections for the Lao People's
Democratic National Assembly were held in 2002, a year earlier
than scheduled.263  Again, the government excluded from
participation in the election all candidates other than those from
the LPRP.264 In 1999, the government arrested five peaceful Lao
student protestors seeking political and economic reform, who
255 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 4.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 3. Examples of such mass organizations include the Lao Front for National
Construction, the Lao Federation of Trade Unions, the Lao People's Revolutionary
Youth Union, and the Lao Women's Union. Id.
258 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 62, § 4.
259 Id.
260 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 6.
261 H.R. Res. 402, 108th Cong. (2004).
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
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remain imprisoned in Laos today.2 65  Two years later, the
government arrested a group of pro-democracy activists, including
a member of the European Parliament, Olivier Dupuis, when they
protested for the release of the Lao students. 66 Prison conditions
are consistently reported as inhumane, life-threatening, and
appalling.
VII. Recommendations
A. International Attention as a Solution
Of the potential solutions for the situation of the Hmong both
in Laos and Thailand, none are judicial and none are binding. The
United Nations must constantly remind Thailand and the LPDR
that it is aware of the many reports of human rights abuses and
treaty violations against the Hmong.
Laos is a party to several treaties267 that require the party-State
to regularly report to the treaty committee of experts (commonly
referred to as the "treaty body") so that those experts can monitor
treaty implementation.268 While the treaty body has no judicial
power, it may request missing Lao reports and ask questions about
the ones received. The treaty body can request explanations
regarding allegations of abuses within the country in hopes of
embarrassing the government. Another country which is a party to
the treaty may also bring the situation in Laos to the attention of
the treaty body. This action requires the treaty body to
communicate with Laos regarding concerns about the Hmong's
265 Press Release, Hmong Peace Task Force Comm. & Ctr. for Pub. Policy
Analysis, Laos, Hmong Hold Rally to Protest Human Rights Violations, Ethnic
Cleansing in Laos (June 11, 2007), available at http://www.prlog.org/10019722-laos-
hmong-hold-human-rights-rally-to-protest-human-rights-violations-ethnic-ceansing-in-
laos.html.
266 H.R. Res. 402, 108th Cong. (2004).
267 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (June 9, 2004),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. Among others, Laos is a party to the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Id. at 6.
268 See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, art. 9 [hereinafter CERD].
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situation.269 Consistent embarrassment and attention may elicit a
response from Laotian officials. The hope is that questioning and
communication would eventually allow international humanitarian
agencies unfettered access to monitor Hmong treatment.
Consider recent communication regarding the LPDR's duties
to report under the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD): the treaty requires
that states report to the Committee every two years270 and detail
"acts of extreme violence," including "bombing of villages, use of
chemical weapons, and [sic] landmines and extrajudicial killings
and torture." '271 The treaty defines racial discrimination as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based
on ... national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.272
Listed obligations of the treaty include citizens' rights to "security
of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily
harm," '273 "freedom of movement and residence," '274 and public
health and medical care.275
In 2003, the Committee on the Elimination on Racial
Discrimination sent a warning letter to Laos expressing "concern
that the [LPDR] . . . is 18 years late in submitting its reports to the
Committee. 276 It also detailed reports of violent attacks on the
Hmong and "urge[d] the State party to halt immediately acts of
violence against members of the Hmong population., 277  The
269 Id. at art. 11.
270 id. at art. 9.
271 International Bureau for Children's Rights, Making Children's Rights Work:
Country Profile on Laos, available at
http://www.ibcr.org/Publications/CRC/DraftCP Asia/LaosPDF.pdf (forthcoming).
272 CERD, supra note 268, at art. 1.
273 Id. at art. 5(b).
274 Id. at art. 5(d)(i).
275 Id. at art. 5(e)(iv).
276 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Situation in the Lao
People's Democratic Republic: Decision 1(63), Laos, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/63/Dec. 1
(Dec. 10, 2003).
277 Id. 6(a).
2008]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
LPDR responded with a report in 2004, but failed to address many
of the international community's concerns.278 The Committee
reviewed this report and made "concluding observations" which
listed fourteen continuing concerns and a few recommendations.279
The Lao government filed comments on the Committee's
concluding observations in May 2006.20 The Government stated:
"As we explained to CERD and the international community on
many occasions, there is no conflict between the Government and
certain members of the Hmong in the Lao People's Democratic
Republic. 2 ' The LPDR explains any armed attacks as reactions
to "banditry, a social phenomenon found in a number of
countries. 2 2  Finally, the LPDR states that it "protects the
legitimate rights and interests of its citizens of all ethnic groups,
including Hmongs, and will take resolute measures, as it deems
necessary, when the national security is in jeopardy., 283
Not only does communication such as the Committee's letter
and report remind the LPDR that the international community
retains ongoing interest in the treatment of Lao citizens, but it
allows the international community to see how the Lao
government views the Hmong situation. By responding that any
armed attacks were acts of "banditry," the government effectively
announced that they do not view the Hmong as a serious threat.
This information is important for treaty bodies and humanitarian
agencies. As previously mentioned, if the Lao government does
not perceive the Hmong to be a security threat, justification for the
Lao government's treatment of the Hmong is unfounded.284
Untimely and incomplete reports are likely common to many
278 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, State Party Report:
Laos, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/451/Add. 1 (May 17, 2004).
279 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Lao
People's Democratic Republic, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/LAO/CO/I 5 (Apr. 18, 2005).
280 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Comments by the
Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic on the Concluding Observations
of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N.
Doc. CERD/C/LAO/CO/15/Add.1 (July 7, 2006).
281 Id. at para. 3.
282 Id.
283 Id. at para. 4.
284 See supra text accompanying note 107.
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of the other treaties to which Laos is a party. The reports of
violence against the Hmong, if true, could constitute a breach of
treaty obligation for each treaty to which Laos is a party.
Heightened and continued demand for these reports would
demonstrate the seriousness of the allegations and might promote
the Lao government to more thoroughly evaluate and explain the
situation.
While Laos is a signatory to other relevant treaties, namely the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, there is no
obligation to abide by the terms in those treaties. There is an
understanding that the State should not act in any way to
undermine the nature of the treaty, but there is no effective
monitoring mechanism or way to sanction any signatory that
undermines the treaty. Thus, the treaties may be an ineffectual
option.
A second means by which to bring attention to the ongoing
struggle of the Hmong is through the United Nations Human
Rights Counsel (HRC), a more visible body than the individual
treaty committees. The HRC performs universal periodic reviews
of each U.N. member state in order to assess member states'
compliance with human rights obligations.285 The HRC is also
available to consider problems that arise within any particular
state. While the review for the LPDR is not scheduled until the
eighth session in 2010, NGOs and "other relevant stakeholders"
may file communication with the HRC to draw attention to the
human rights violations.286  As MSF is the only international
humanitarian aid organization with an ongoing first-hand look at
the situation of the Hmong in Thailand, detailed summaries filed
by MSF may be especially important to include to information
gathered in anticipation of the universal review. Unfortunately, if
the date of the Lao review cannot be changed to an earlier date,
HRC may be unable to evaluate the reports presented by MSF in
time to assist with the current Hmong problems.
Individual countries can put pressure on the governments of
Laos and Thailand as well. After a May 2008 hunger strike at the
Huay Nam Khao camp in Thailand, Representative Patrick A.
285 G.A. Res. 60/251, 5(e), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Sept. 13, 2005); H.R.C.
Res.5/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/5/1 (June 18, 2007).
286 H.R.C. Res.5/1, 15(c), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/5/1 (June 18, 2007).
2008]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Kennedy of the U.S. House of Representatives introduced House
Resolution 1273, which calls on Thailand to stop repatriations and
Laos to stop military attacks on the Jungle Hmong. 287  The
resolution is currently before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
Finally, since the U.S. general public knows so little about the
situation in Laos, any and all means of raising awareness will be
beneficial. Unfortunately, it is dangerous and difficult for
journalists and reporters to make the trek to the jungles.288 Any
documentation that has already become public should continue to
be circulated. As Steven Spielberg drew attention to China's
controversial aid to Sudan by withdrawing as artistic director to
the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing,289  perhaps a similar
individual, organization, or company could bring awareness to the
actions of the LPDR.
VIII. Ineffective or Unlikely Solutions for the Hmong's Plight
The following solutions are either impossible under
international law or likely to fail. Some have been suggested in
passing without deeper evaluation of their probability of
implementation. To find an effective and permanent solution for
the Hmong and others in similar situations, it is necessary to
understand why many legal forums and non-legal alternatives are
unavailable.
A. Problems with Holding the Lao Government and
Individual Actors Responsible for Genocide
Many human rights organizations have referred to the actions
of the LPDR as genocide. The universally accepted definition of
genocide used in customary international law is contained in
Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention),29 ° to which Laos
287 H.R. Res. 1273, 110th Cong. (2008).
288 See supra text accompanying notes 94-102.
289 Helene Cooper, Spielberg Drops Out as Adviser to Beiing Olympics in Dispute
over Darfur Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at A 12.
290 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2,
Dec. 11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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acceded in December 1950.291 Article 2 lists a number of acts, any
of which "committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" would
constitute genocide.292 The most common act associated with
genocide is "killing members of the group. 293  Others include
"causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,"
and "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part.
294
On the surface, it seems that the LPDR's actions in killing the
Hmong or dropping chemicals into the jungles would constitute
genocide. The first problem, however, is that the Hmong may not
fit into any of the listed targeted groups. While the Hmong are a
distinct ethnic group, it is likely that the LPDR is killing them for
their political beliefs, for not all Hmong are persecuted. The
LPDR does not target those Hmong that are part of the Communist
government or have been an integrated part of society since the
LPDR came to power in the 1970s.
Even assuming the Hmong constitute a protected group under
the Genocide Convention, determining whether the LPDR's
killing was with the intent to destroy "in part" complicates the
analysis. 295 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia noted that "it is widely acknowledged that the
intention to destroy must target at least a substantial part of the
group."'2 96 Considerations in determining whether a substantial
portion of the group is targeted for destruction include
examination of the size of the targeted group compared to the
entire group, numerically and in "relation to the overall size of the
entire group."'297 Unfortunately, since thirty-three years have
passed since the Hmong first retreated to the jungles, many have
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. at art. 2(a).
294 Id. at art. 2(b) - 2(c).
295 Id. at art. 2.
296 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Appeal Judgment, 8 (April 19,
2004) (quoting Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Trial Judgment, 82
(December 14, 1999)).
297 Id. 12.
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disappeared or died of both natural and unnatural causes. High
estimates of Hmong in the jungle number 17,000;298 those seeking
asylum in Thailand add roughly 6,000 to the targeted group.299
Out of the estimated 450,000300 Hmong currently living in Laos,
23,000 is arguably a relatively small portion of the entire
population. Another consideration is the targeted group's
prominence within the Hmong population: whether a specific part
of the group is "emblematic of the overall group" or is "essential
to its survival."3'' The survival of the Hmong in Laos as an ethnic
minority may not depend on the group of persecuted Hmong. The
loss of 17,000 seemingly invisible individuals would likely not
threaten the existence or character of the larger group of 450,000.
Similarly, the 8,000 Hmong seeking asylum in Thailand have been
living outside of Laos for quite some time and may also not
threaten the existence or character of the group of 450,000.02
Proving intent to destroy the group would be much less
difficult than proving some other elements of genocide. Intent is
explicit in the 1975 vow to "exterminate to the root of the tribe,"
and the "shoot to kill" orders. Intent is also implicit in the
monetary reward for the body of each Hmong killed, and
membership in the Communist party.30 3
Not only do complications exist in determining whether the
Genocide Convention applies to the small group of an estimated
23,000 Hmong, but judicial resolution would also prove to be a
challenge. The Genocide Convention confers jurisdiction for
related disputes on the International Court of Justice (ICJ).3"4
Thus, by signing the Genocide Convention, the LPDR has
298 Letter from Vaughn Vang, Executive Dir. of the Lao Human Rights Council,
Inc., to Viengsamay Srithirath, World Bank Office, Vientiane, LPDR (Jan. 12, 2007),
available at http://www.laohumanrightscouncil.org/documents/Ms_Viengsamay_Srithita
thPost.pdf.
299 Hmong to be Sent Back to Laos, supra note 226.
300 Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 4.
301 Prosecutor v. Krstic, 12.
302 An argument could be made that the participation of over 40,000 Hmong in
resisting the Communist forces is part of the "character" of the whole group of Lao-
Hmong, and that the disappearance of the remainder of this group threatens the character
of the group.
303 See Jacobs, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
304 Genocide Convention, supra note 290, at art. 9.
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effectively consented to the ICJ specifically for violations under
the Genocide Convention. In addition, the option to bring charges
which fall under customary international law in front of any forum
under universal jurisdiction30 5 proves equally difficult.3"6
B. Problems with Holding the LPDR and Individual Actors
Responsible for Crimes against Humanity
Borrowing terminology directly from the Khoa-xane Pathet
Lao publication,3"7 the government could be held for violating
Crimes against Humanity, specifically under an "extermination"
provision. Crimes against Humanity is also ajus cogens crime of
customary international law, but unlike genocide, there is no
universally accepted statute for Crimes against Humanity. Article
7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
30 8
provides an example of a statute. Listed acts, "when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack," include
"murder; ... extermination; ... deportation or forcible transfer of
population;... rape; ... and enforced disappearance of persons.30 9
Much of the violence against the Hmong falls into the above
listed acts, each of which constitutes a Crime against Humanity.
However, to be eligible for protection, the Hmong must first
qualify as a "civilian" population, a label that arguably does not
apply because the Hmong are armed. If the Hmong present a true
threat to the government or other Lao citizens, they may not
qualify as "civilians," but rather militia or rebels; thus they might
not qualify for protection under the Crimes against Humanity
laws. The counterargument is that the Hmong are not truly armed.
Since so few of the remaining Hmong in the jungle are Secret
Army veterans, their only weaponry is decades-old, and the
quality of their ammunition is questionable.310 Further, LPDR
officials refer to any presence of people in the jungle as "bandits,"
305 See discussion infra note 320 and accompanying text.
306 See discussion infra Part VIII.C.
307 See Jacobs, supra note 2, at 144.
308 The Rome Statute established the ICC. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 1.
309 Id. at art. 7.
310 See Perrin, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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no longer calling them "rebels."311
The Hmong may also not be able to rely on protection from the
Crimes against Humanity laws because problems exist in finding
LPDR officials or individuals who are responsible for Crimes
against Humanity. If it is possible to name specific governmental
actors or military officers who have violated international law, it
may still be impossible to find judicial resolution. Sitting
governmental officials have immunity under universal
jurisdiction.3t2  Thus, the question of finding guilty parties,
particularly when combined with the issue of whether the Hmong
are even classified as civilians, undermines the ability of the
Hmong to rely on the Crimes against Humanity laws as a basis for
providing ongoing future protection. In a similar analysis, it
would be difficult to use War Crimes as a means of providing
protection.
C. Judicial Forums: An Unlikely Remedy for the Jungle
Hmong
Since Laos is not a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, no
permanent forum exists through which to prosecute Laos or Lao
officials for violations of customary international law, which
include Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and War Crimes.
The ICC forum is open only to parties who have ratified the Rome
Statute,31 3 and has jurisdiction over crimes occurring only after
2002. 3 14 Thus, this remedy is limited by the inability to identify
those who commit the crimes, excluding crimes that occurred prior
to 2002, and excluding Laos as a whole.
As another option, the Hmong could sue an individual actor
using the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1979,' but this would require
that the individual be present in the United States at the time of
311service. 6 Without personal jurisdiction over the individual, a
31" Amnesty Int'l 2007 Report, supra note 12, at 7.
312 See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
313 Rome Statute at art. 12.
314 Id. at art. 11(1). Even if Laos were to ratify the Rome Statute in the future, the
ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed after a State's entry into force
date. Id. at art. 11(2). As such, the ICC would not be able to review the crimes that
have already occurred to date.
315 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
316 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
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civil suit would not be available in the United States. 317  The
known presence of a specific individual on United States territory
is only the beginning of a difficult case for the Hmong, but since
presence in the United States does not appear likely, this option
also seems unhelpful.
In considering whether domestic prosecution is possible within
Laos itself, sovereign immunity appears to block that option. The
highly controversial concept of universal jurisdiction 3 18 is always
cited as an option for treaty violations, yet rarely produces
effective results. 319  Belgium has been aggressive in trying
individuals under universal jurisdiction, but has recently limited its
capability to hear such cases.32 ° If a State did decide to try any
Lao individual for ajus cogens crime under universal jurisdiction,
it would likely do so by a trial in absentia. 321  Absent the
defendant, the trial is likely to be ineffective.322 Further, the ICJ
concluded in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium that the
immunity of a Minister of Foreign Affairs protects him from any
"act of authority of another state which would hinder him or her in
the performance of his or her duties," such as the universal
jurisdiction asserted by Belgium. 323 If the decision in this case
becomes widely accepted, the only individuals that could be
brought to trial under universal jurisdiction would be former
governmental officials, individuals with no ties to the Lao
military, or those who willingly submit. Thus, prosecution under
universal jurisdiction appears to be an unlikely solution.
Although the ICJ hears a relatively small number of cases, the
317 id.
318 'Universal jurisdiction' refers to the competence of a national court to try a
person suspected of a serious international crime-such as genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity or torture-even if neither the suspect nor the victim are nationals of
the country where the court is located ("the forum state"), and the crime took place
outside that country." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The
State of the Art, 18 HuM. RTS. WATCH 1, 1 (2006), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/ij0606/ij0606web.pdf.
319 See id. at 1-4.
320 Id. at 37.
321 See id at 56-57.
322 See id at 62.
323 Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
14).
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forum is available for violations ofjus cogens crimes.32 4 If heard,
cases regarding Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and War
Crimes would likely be before the ICJ. Even if the argument
could be made that the Hmong are the victims of genocide, it is
highly unlikely that the ICJ would prosecute the case; the ICJ has
never heard any similar cases."' The ICJ has accepted jurisdiction
forjus cogens crimes only in dictum.
For Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, each State-
party must consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ before either
State-party can bring a case before the court.32 6 Some States have
signed a blanket-consent to ICJ jurisdiction, but Laos is not a party
to the ICJ outside of the compulsory consent attached to the
Genocide Convention. 327 Laos' consent to any forum is highly
unlikely, given a 2000 bilateral agreement with China where the
countries stated their belief that the principle of universality of
human rights must be linked to each country's specific national
conditions. 32 8 Laos is "opposed to any hegemonic deeds of using
human rights as an excuse to infringe upon a country's national
sovereignty and interfere with its internal affairs. 329
Finally, an ad hoc tribunal is unlikely to be created in this
situation. Due to the time and expense in forming and running the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, it is possible that the
United Nations Security Council would not authorize another
similar tribunal. Although the Hmong have been persecuted for
over three decades, the United Nations Security Council may view
the dwindling number of people affected as insufficient for the
time and cost of creating these tribunals. Ceasing the creation of
324 Statute and Rules of the Court, 1940 P.C.I.J. 21-22 (ser. D) No. 1 [hereinafter
ICJ Statute].
325 The closest case to come before the ICJ questions whether the Genocide
Convention is applicable to the alleged crimes. The case came before the ICJ only after
charges were already brought in court. Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 1996 I.C.J.
595 (July 11, 1996).
326 See ICJ Statute at 22.
327 See id
328 China, Laos Agree on Increased Cooperation, PEOPLE'S DAILY (China), Nov. 13,
2000, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200011/12/2ng20001112_5
4956.html [hereinafter China, Laos Agree on Increased Cooperation].
329 Id
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ad hoc tribunals for individual situations may also push more
States to join the ICC. Even if the Security Council did set up an
ad hoc tribunal for the atrocities in Laos, the People's Republic of
China, one of the permanent five members on the Council and a
strong ally of Laos, would probably veto the decision.
A hybrid tribunal like the Extraordinary Chamber Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC) 330 is also not a viable option. The ECCC and
similar hybrid tribunals in Kosovo,331 East Timor,332 and Sierra
Leone333 are comprised of national and international judges.
Created by treaty, a court of this nature would require the consent
and cooperation of LPDR. Thus, none of the above judicial
forums appear to be workable solutions to the struggle of the
Hmong.
D. Non-Judicial Solutions: Withholding Aid and
Implementing Trade Embargoes and Travel Restrictions
Outside of judicial measures, which generally seem
ineffective, it appears unlikely that the LPDR will be persuaded to
protect the Hmong without a great deal of international pressure.
Withholding aid would appear to be an effective means of
persuading the government to change its position on the treatment
of this group. The Hmong would likely not be affected by
reduction or withholding of aid since the government denies the
plight of the Hmong and since there are no humanitarian agencies
able to distribute aid. The World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank have been
reported to have "donor fatigue" because of the repeated refusal by
330 See generally Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, amended Oct. 27, 2004, Royal Decree No. NS/RKMI1004/006
(Cambodia) (establishing a tribunal of Cambodian and international judges to prosecute
serious crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime).
331 See S.C. Res. 1244, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
332 See generally Agreement on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive
Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offenses in East Timor, U.N. Transitional
Administration in East Timor, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000), pursuant to
U.N. SCOR Res. 1272 (establishing a hybrid tribunal in East Timor).
333 See generally Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra
Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (establishing a hybrid tribunal in Sierra
Leone).
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the LPDR to reform its practices.334 However, the People's
Republic of China provides monetary assistance without pushing
for Lao reform, and Japan, Laos' largest provider of aid, also does
not allow politics to have bearing on financial decisions.335
A trade embargo may be another way to express disapproval of
the country's actions but would probably be ineffectual and take
too long to implement. If an embargo were to be considered,
Thailand would be a much better target than Laos. Laos trades
most lucratively with China, Thailand, and Vietnam, and has
bilateral agreements and strong relations with each.336 None of
these countries would likely be willing to embargo Laos, and an
embargo on Laos from a different country would make a much
lesser impact. For example, in 2007, the United States exported
$13.4 million in goods to Laos and imported only $20 million
from Laos.337 Thailand, on the other hand, exported $22.7 billion
to the United States and received $8.4 billion in imports.338
Furthermore, the United States would be unlikely to place an
embargo on Laos because it just lifted a previous embargo on the
country in 2004. 339  The United States has benefited from
cooperation with Laos. For example, bilateral work has led to
recovery of American soldiers missing in action, and as part of its
trade agreement with Laos, the United States made gains in
counter-narcotics and the removal of land mines.340 The United
States also signed made an agreement with Vietnam to repatriate
thousands of undocumented Vietnamese residing in the United
States.34' Considering the strong relationship between Laos and
334 Ian Storey, China and Vietnam's Tug of War Over Laos, 5 CHINA BRIEF 3, 4
(2005). "Donor fatigue" describes donors' concerns and frustrations that their charitable
contributions have made little to no impact on the well-being of the intended recipients.
See, e.g., Alex Markels, The Cure for Donor Fatigue: Give Wisely, NPR, Dec. 16, 2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5048902.
335 Storey, supra note 334, at 3.
336 See, e.g., China, Laos Agree on Increased Cooperation, supra note 328, at para. 11.
337 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS (2007).
338 Id.
339 THOMAS LUM, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, LAOS: BACKGROUND AND U.S.
RELATIONS, CRS REPORT NUMBER RS2093 1, Feb. 5, 2007.
340 Id.
341 Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Assistant
Secretary Myers Signs Historical MOU with Vietnam, January 22, 2008,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080122washington.htm.
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Vietnam,34 2 the United States probably will not act in any way
which might jeopardize its own progress with Vietnam. The same
argument probably applies to the United States embargoing
Thailand because Thailand also shares a strong relationship with
Vietnam.
Convincing Congress or another country's equivalent body of
the urgent need for an embargo may also be difficult. By the time
an embargo could be established, Thailand would have already
repatriated the Hmong, based on the timeline in the Lao-Thai
bilateral agreement.
If a trade embargo on Laos is not a realistic option, perhaps the
United States should consider restricting just one type of
transaction in Laos. In conflicts with other countries, the United
States prohibited investments beginning after the date of
embargo.343 Unfortunately, restricting one type of transaction in
Laos is unlikely to happen, as the United States continues to
promote foreign investment in Laos despite the disappearance of
three Hmong-Americans traveling to Laos for investment purposes
in 1997.344
A travel restriction against Laos or Thailand might promote
change by damaging reputations of either of these tourist-
dependent countries. However, in the end, a travel restriction may
be more detrimental to the Lao or Thai citizens, depending on the
distribution of tourist-related income, than beneficial to the
Hmong. Travel restrictions may also foster negative attitudes
toward future travelers from the restricting country, potentially
causing additional problems or future violence against that
population. Further, preventing travelers from entering either
country may make foreigners aware of the fact that something is
going on in the country but does little to raise awareness to the
actual circumstances if journalists and humanitarian activists are
prevented from entering.
Instead of threatening Laos into allowing humanitarian
monitors, perhaps Laos can be encouraged to cooperate by
342 See LUM, supra note 339.
343 See U.S. Dep't of the Treas. Office of Foreign Assets Control, An Overview of
the Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 537 (2002).
344 Jason DeRusha, Three Hmong Men from Minn. Missing in Laos (Sept. 4, 2007),
http://wcco.com/topstories/hmong.ethnic.laos.2.370032.html.
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receiving increased funding on the condition that international
organizations are able to provide aid. With the improvement of
Hmong conditions within Laos, perhaps fewer Hmong would be
tempted to flee to Thailand and the Lao government could
persuade more Hmong to leave the jungles and safely rejoin Lao
society.
E. Ineffective Solutions Specific to the Hmong Awaiting
Repatriation
Solutions for the Hmong awaiting repatriation also present
problems. For many of the same reasons as above, holding
Thailand responsible for violating the customary international law
of nonrefoulement will be difficult.
In addition, the more opposition of the Hmong, perhaps the
more harshly they will be treated upon return to Laos. In the
unlikely event that the Hmong from the refugee camps are
resettled in third countries, more Hmong will flee into Thailand as
soon as the previous refugees have left. It is probable that
Thailand would see an influx of Hmong similar to the group of
4,000-6,000 that crossed the Mekong after the 1994 resettlement
of 10,000-15,000 in the United States and other countries. This
scenario could repeat itself for decades to come, as it has occurred
for decades past. While offering a permanent solution for those
currently in Thailand, this is not a permanent resolution for all of
the parties involved.
IX. Conclusion
Former U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Ambassador H.
Eugene Douglas asks the ultimate question:
More than thirty years after cessation of hostilities in
Southeast Asia, decades after the normalization of relations
between the United States and the Governments of Laos
and Vietnam, how could we have failed so badly to resolve
the issue of the permanent resettlement of the relatively
small remaining population of Laotian and Hmong still
confined to refugee camps in Thailand?345
345 Press Release, Ctr. for Pub. Policy Analysis, Laos, Thailand Crisis: Action
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The struggle of the Hmong will continue in the jungles of Laos
and in the refugee camps of Thailand until measures are taken to
ensure a permanent, safe solution. While punishment for
historical violations, if feasible, might discourage future crimes, it
will likely not be effective as a means to encourage desirable
future behavior or find a safe and permanent home for the 23,000
men, women, and children affected by this situation.
L. CATHERINE CURRIE
Urged by U.S. Ambassador, Congress on Hmong (June 20, 2008), available at
http://media-newswire.com/release_1067968.html.
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